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abstract 
  
 
This has been a year of major distress for the American Intelligence Community (IC).  
Questionable intelligence about weapons of mass destruction led to questionable decisions about 
going to war in Iraq, which alienated large sectors of civil society and governments around the 
world.  Of course, there are also big fans of this decision, both in the IC and elsewhere.  But that 
is only one of the major problems that spies and intelligence analysts face.  For example, there is 
a purge going on in the CIA as we meet today, as the fans of global intervention drive off critics 
there.  A major “reform” bill was passed, and neutered by the Pentagon among others.  This 
paper will focus on a largely taboo topic, the many ways by which intelligence tradecraft 
induces mental illness among many (not all) intelligence professionals.  This leads in turn to 
errors of every kind.  It leads to difficulty learning from past mistakes, and coping with novel 
problems.  It also leads to very high rates of divorce, alcoholism and pain among our spies and 
analysts.  And finally, it leads to confusing friends with enemies.  Of particular importance to the 
field of Peace Studies is a common confusion between peace activists and “terrorists” (or in an 
earlier era, with communists).  When fear is great and security institutions are stressed to find 
some bad guys, some of them literally cannot distinguish between “peace activists” and whoever 
the source of fear for the day is.  Dissent is confused with treason.  Thus did J. Edgar Hoover 
target civil rights activists, anti-war activists, labor activists and many others during the infamous 
COINTELPRO days.  Some of the less stable people in our current FBI and DHS (Department of 
Homeland Security) are compiling lists of “potential terrorists” today that include peace activists, 
labor, human rights enthusiasts, environmentalists, feminists, “liberals,” etc.  This problem is 
particularly acute in the Joint Terrorism Taskforces that have been ordered to identify “potential 
terrorists” in every county in America.  Since actual terrorists are rare and very hard to find, but 
peace activists and other liberal groups are relatively abundant, public and easy to find, many 
peace people are on such lists today.  The paper that follows looks at a range of clinical mental 
problems that are induced or exacerbated by the practices of IC agencies (called “tradecraft” in 
their jargon) and how such problems make working for peace more difficult during times of war.  
Paradoxically and tragically, they also make solving traditional and legitimate security problems 
of intelligence more difficult too.  In both ways protecting our people and preserving freedom 
become harder.  Stressed out spies and CI guys (counter intelligence) make many errors, of 
which confusing peace people with terrorists is just one especially irritating example. 
 
 
[A paper follows that was prepared for the CIA and a variety of spies about ten months ago.  At the end is a 
postscript for our peace community on why psychopathology among spies is especially important for us.] 
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 “The CIA has the highest divorce rate of any government agency” a source of mine said.  
Since he was a career intelligence veteran in his 70’s, I figured he was probably correct.  Thus 
began a search to answer some questions with larger boundaries, like why the extreme resistance 
to change, and why the dramatic intelligence failures that no one studies more than the IC itself?  
 
 Why study dysfunction in national intelligence agencies?  Because polite society is 
deeply dependent on a good, functional, healthy and wise intelligence community, all the more 
so in an age of terrorism and spreading WMDs.  If you are sick, we are in danger.  Actually, we 
are in plenty of danger already, so we pray most sincerely for your quick and complete recovery. 
 
The Intelligence Community is also besieged by critics, some of whom don’t have a clue 
what they are talking about, so a high degree of skepticism is appropriate to dramatic claims like 
I will make here.  Even high ranking, career insiders with large staffs and mandates (like ex-NSA 
director, General William Odom) have a difficult time grasping the totality of the IC system and 
struggle to get a hearing for their sincere reform proposals (1).  Such thoughtful reviews typically 
deal with policy, budgets and organizational structure, but few can deal with the taboos I will 
discuss today.  The best, and last such daring effort I am aware of was “The CIA and the Cult of 
Intelligence” (2) by a former exec. to a DDCI* and a five year veteran of State. Thirty years 
later, after many large reviews (3, 4, 5, 6, 7) the parallels with cult dysfunction remain profound. 
  
Part of my answer is disturbing.  Intelligence “Tradecraft” induces mental illness.  To 
some this is heresy, to others, much less than a shocking discovery.  Still it bothers me.  Combine 
that induction with the exceptional stresses that go with operations and even with some analytic 
work, and you have a formula for tattered relationships.  The security clearance system frustrates 
getting effective help, since the circle of ‘OK’ counselors is tiny and their loyalty to the company 
is usually greater than their loyalty to you. Trust is a precious thing in all human affairs, none 
more so than in marriages and counseling.  But trust is also a fragile asset in the corrosive 
environment of spies, lies and endless rules regarding whom you can talk to, how and when.  
 
Since security clearances required for one’s career frustrate getting effective help, and 
since exceptional stresses undoubtedly exist that are inexorable parts of the difficult work that 
spies, analysts and CI* people do, almost everyone inside is affected. When everyone is affected 
few can see the damage clearly.  Those who do often leave their agencies with the stain of ‘not 
being a team player’ or ‘disgruntled’ or ‘not that good anyway.’  Other psychological defenses 
are profound, really, impressively armor-plated.  So strong measures and words are necessary. * 
The rest of this essay will address this problem bluntly, but aims at solutions for practitioners.  
 
 
                                                 
* The DCI is Director of Central Intelligence; a DDCI is a deputy director.  The IC is the Intelligence Community 
and CI is CounterIntelligence, or the folks who look for spies among us and in their agencies. The DO is Directorate 
of Operations and the DI is the Directorate of Intelligence; these are the two largest units in the CIA.  The DO has 
dominated the DI historically.  Otherwise I will try to avoid the acronyms so common in spooky-luky land * (37). 
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Divorce Rates, Alcoholism, and Low Morale  
(due to a toxic, corrosive, unhealthy working environment) 
 
 Many of the conclusions I will relate today apply to intelligence organizations in general, 
but my main focus will be the CIA since it is the easiest of America’s 15 intelligence agencies to 
examine.  Much has been written elsewhere about differences in agency cultures related to their 
different functions, and I will recognize those aspects briefly in two sections to follow.  But for 
now, the question is: Does the CIA really have the highest divorce rate of any U.S. government 
agency, as alleged, and if so, why?  I called the CIA’s public affairs office, to get the ‘real story’ 
on agency divorce rates and if very lucky some help getting access to voluminous data they must 
have on the whole range of mental dysfunctions there since they test their people so thoroughly 
even to get a job interview, much less to be let loose on the world in operations. 
 
 Mentally ill people are sometimes reluctant to discuss their problems with professionals, 
or with prying strangers, or even to admit to themselves that anything could possibly be wrong.  
The PR people told me everything was just peachy at the agency.  Right.  Then they said they 
don’t discuss personnel issues with the public; check out their website.  Right.  Surprise; nothing 
was there about divorce rates, alcoholism, mental illness, or any other negative consequences of 
employment at the agency.  But everyone else says that morale is awful, especially now. 
 
So I read agency veteran F.W. Rustmann’s article in the Baltimore Sun of Dec. 8, 1996 
(8), where he writes that when former DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner was trying to clean house, 
he asked a Naval Academy friend Rusty Williams to check out the DO.  “One of the things he 
found was a particularly high divorce rate among CIA officers.  Predictably he attributed this 
more to loose morals rather than stress, long hours and the dangers of their work.”  Moralism 
among “outsider” DCIs has been routinely deflected by defensive DO’s, but at a great price.  I 
will be moralistic here, and more biographical than any academic should be.  The reasons should 
be clear if you read on.  One of them is the considerable suffering among the better spies today. 
 
 Regarding moralism, let me affirm that this is a special problem in this domain, both 
excessive judgmentalism and excessively permissive attitudes (I have friends in both camps).  
But the greatest danger is that it reinforces psychological defense mechanisms that prevent the 
relevant psychopathologies from being healed.  Excessive moralism offends more than it heals.  
So in the interest of full disclosure I affirm that I have personally committed almost every sin I 
will write about today, including spying on people, penetrating hostile intelligence agencies, and 
unearthing (and exposing) hostile spies sent to sow disinformation among unwitting American 
publics.  I will spare you all the stories here; the point is that I have considerable sympathy for 
the people who work in such environments every day.  So, like a zealous young priest, I would 
like to save their souls, or at least, their marriages and mental equilibria.  More on priests later. 
 
 Regarding alcoholism, the first clue was the physical danger of being between the boys 
and the bar when the 5:00 bell rings.  When I study serious issues I never rely only on literature, 
because there are some things you just have to experience to understand.  Believe me, more work 
occurs at the bar than not, and that does not always wait for 5:00.  It is actually difficult not to 
become a chronic drinker if you study spies like I do.  Then there was an allegation by female 
operators in a class-action lawsuit that the culture of alcoholism in the DO was so profound that 
professional progress virtually required turning into boozer bar girls themselves.  This did not fit 
the feminist formula for career advancement, and being hard-core operators they were not about 
to roll over for a bunch of lushes.  
 4 
 
Loch Johnson, in a really exceptional essay on problems in the IC written with great 
sympathy for the professionals who work there, had this to say about that in 2001 (9, page 11). 
 
“Alcoholism is widespread inside the secret agencies (and widely ignored), a result in part  
of the stressful conditions under which many officers live overseas.  They are often under close 
surveillance by hostile intelligence services and, in addition, they have odd working hours that 
entail late-night rendezvous and much social drinking as they seek to develop rapport with 
potential foreign recruits.  Colleagues in the CIA’s fraternity of case officers waved aside Aldrich 
Ames’s periodic bouts of drunkenness, just one aspect of his horrendous “corridor file.”  After all, 
if the Agency’s legendary chief of counterintelligence, James Angleton, and other senior officials 
could enjoy three-Martini lunches, why not their subordinates?  This protective old-boy system 
among case officers that buffered Ames for so many years is one of the CIA’s most serious 
problems.”     
 
 There are other professions with exceptionally high rates of divorce, alcoholism, and 
stress.  These include police, attorneys, and psychiatric care-givers.  There are other professions 
with higher death rates than the CIA, like farmers and coal miners. They don’t have to fear being 
tortured to death like Beirut CIA station chief William Buckley, but they do know they may be 
eaten alive by their machines in a lonely field after 16 hour workdays, or trapped underground to 
die slowly in darkness and despair.  No one has a higher death rate than soldiers at war, and they 
certainly bear psychiatric consequences.  Yet their marriages endure more often, and other signs 
of stress are less.  I have concluded, rightly or wrongly, that the main reason these other tough 
professions can manage their considerable work-related stresses better than spies is their ability 
to maintain a healthier relationship with polite society in general, unhindered by the thought 
control police whom ‘intelligence professionals’ must endure.  More on this soon. 
 
Denial, Deception and the DO vs. the DI  
 
 Few people illustrate the varieties of denial better than committed, but “compensated” 
alcoholics (compensated means you are not so far gone you can’t keep a job or shave anymore).  
All the more so when they are brilliant, creative people.  Such people generate brilliant, creative 
rationalizations, so brilliant in fact that they often fool themselves more than others.  Combine 
brilliant boozers with extensive education in the very best, time-tested techniques for deception 
and denial, and you can cultivate some minds that can fool themselves into a real pit of misery. 
 
 That’s their problem.  Resulting damage to American national security is our problem.  
Damage to their families is why they have such high divorce rates, one of several reasons, all 
ultimately related to a culture of deception and denial that is corrosive to healthy relationships. 
 
 Every study I’ve examined comments in some way on “interagency rivalries” as another 
serious impediment to optimum function for our intelligence “community.”  Some refer to a 
“culture problem” in the operations side of the CIA, or in the CIA entire.  None come right out 
and claim that alcoholic nut cases are clinging to power there by any means necessary.  No one 
wants to be unkind, of course, and I don’t either.  But there’s more.  No one wants to trigger the 
severe defensiveness of highly stressed out people with significant mental illness at the agency. 
 
 The DO is very different from the DI, to my eyes anyway.  DI types are very much like 
professors or journalists, with the big exception that they do not publish their work publicly.  
This makes it more vulnerable to egregious errors because of the insular, politicized intellectual 
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environment.  That’s a real, and a big problem, but still a less serious problem than the criminal 
mindset of the DO.  That mindset is quite helpful for actual spies and the people who manage 
spies (case officers in agency lingo).  It is often observed that the skills of the con artist are 
essential for operations, and are usually incompatible with the skills of the cops in the FBI or of 
the professional paranoids in either agency who do counterintelligence (CI) work.  However, we 
should also recognize that the DO has always dominated the DI, and other parts of the larger IC 
(like the FBI) partly because of the operators’ ruthless skills and virtual immunity to prosecution. 
 
 But second, we should not blame them too much for being that way because we selected 
them, we trained them, we put them in the field under awful conditions, and we tasked them to 
commit crimes against other nations in the interest of our own “national security” (or, for mere 
prosperity which is a different goal).  Most of all, Presidents authorize most covert operations 
and as many critics have noted, these problems are not likely to change so long as Presidents 
view the CIA as their personal academy for secret power.  They always do. 
 
 Finally, large segments of the American public prefer things this way.  They want goods 
like absolute security and cheap gasoline without being bothered by the messy details necessary 
to deliver them.  It is not fair to insist that our government deliver certain goods “by any means 
necessary” and then complain when shocking methods are used.  Still, a big part of the problem 
in the IC is that these methods are deliberately obscured by a veil of secrecy, which covers sloth 
and criminal behaviors just as well as “national security,” or legitimately secret information. 
 
 I am a DO type; capable of every kind of evil if it is necessary.  Ruthless, manipulative, 
self-centered, aggressive – that’s me.  Controlling that dark side has been a big part of growing 
up, and there is no guarantee that control will never fail.  The DO teaches people to regard every 
relationship as something to be manipulated for an objective.  That is disgusting; so is blowing 
someone’s head off.  But I when I head out on a mission either one is possible.  What I have just 
described is also the profile of a military intelligence officer, a compensated psychopath, or a 
jihadist, and all are important to the problems at the CIA.  Some find warm homes there; others 
wage war.  Many agencies share these problems.  For a review of these issues in Israel’s Mossad  
I recommend “By Way of Deception” by Victor Ostrovsky and Claire Hoy, 1990 (10, but see 
footnotes on other Israeli authors).  These problems are neither new nor distinctly American.  
 
Sociopaths, Narcissists and Psychopathic Personalities 
 
 Sociopaths hate society and authority, narcissists love themselves, and psychopaths lack a 
conscience or in extreme cases, even the ability to empathize at all.  One of my more interesting 
sources claimed that the CIA specifically looked for, and selected psychopathic personalities 
“because they make better spies.”  He claimed to be a Ph.D. psychologist and a veteran of the 
CIA, and he certainly was fond of their work, not a critic in the usual sense.  But validating the 
authenticity, credibility and reliability of sources is a big headache in serious work on spies, 
since they are such good liars and, when authentic, are attached to agencies that deliberately 
obscure the connection.  He probably had a real Ph.D. in clinical psychology; whether he ever 
actually worked for the U.S. government is less certain.  That he studied spies and enjoyed the 
psychiatric patterns, nuances and rationalizations of espionage was without a doubt. 
 
 So let us examine the claim for “face validity.”  How might psychopathic personalities 
“make better spies?”  Would such people in the operations side of intelligence agencies fit with 
their record as seen by veterans, and from abroad (i.e., unfiltered by our domestic, lapdog press, 
which is another issue)?  Well one thing psychopaths do much better than most people is to pass 
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lie detector tests.  Another thing they can do quite well is to hurt people without remorse.  And 
the distinguishing characteristic of psychopaths (11) is a ruthless self-interest, unbuffered by 
empathy or “conscience.”  Finally, since these qualities frighten polite society and can be 
apparent early in life, they have usually lived very secret, double lives for decades to avoid 
punishments from more sociable others who are scared by ruthless, excellent liars who lack 
remorse.  So maintaining cover stories and lying persuasively is like breathing to psychopaths. 
 
 Well, those sound like useful skills for actual spies to me.  The original source for this 
allegation claimed energetically that, despite this calculated selection of psychopaths for at least 
some operations, the “sane” people at CIA always maintained control of the others by methods 
he described in some detail.  A number of other sources of mine with fully verifiable inside 
experience, in both the DO as well as the DI, have made similar claims that the “cowboys” are 
always controlled by their handlers, the nuts by their shrinks, or the operators by their security 
personnel at home.  Some of the control mechanisms described would raises hairs on normal 
heads, but that’s another matter.  Still, one wonders if control is really all that good when you 
consider the foreign perspective on the CIA, which is almost 100% awful. 
 
 Being peculiar myself (anyone who studies spies closely must have at least a few screws 
loose) I want to reaffirm one other serious point.  There is no doubt in my mind that tradecraft 
induces some of those ruthless mental issues, and paranoia in particular.  When you are closely 
observing people with reputations for dangerous behavior, meeting strange guys with fake names 
in dark bars with guns under their armpits and so forth, it is quite hard not to become at least a bit 
paranoid.  Imagine the situation case officers face, who must do this in foreign countries with 
police-state governments where there is no doubt at all what may happen if they get caught. 
 
 Just three more points on this collection of mental problems.  First, mental illnesses blend 
and merge; these categories are fluid, related, and to a large degree artificial.  Psychopaths and 
sociopaths can be considered variants of “anti-social personalities” but that’s mere nomenclature.  
Second, sociopaths hate society with its many rules and constraints.  Being unconstrained can be 
useful for spy missions, where “any means necessary” to get the job done is a common rule.  The 
main mission is deception, betrayal and stealing things, after all, what would you expect?  But 
the CIA is so concerned about maintaining positive control of its operatives (largely due to a 
long list of very embarrassing and damaging covert operation failures) that I think the agency 
tries hard to screen out the sociopaths.  Finally, narcissistic disorders are an especially fluid and 
complex spectrum of mental dysfunctions.  No one has characterized the truly evil “malignant 
narcissist” better than M. Scott Peck (12).  His book should be required reading for psychiatrists 
at the CIA, along with “The Mask of Sanity,” the classic work on psychopaths by Cleckley (11). 
 
Paranoia and Schizophrenia, in individuals and institutions 
 
 I am going to switch now to a less obvious issue.  The core point is that there are parallels 
between individual psychopathology and organizational structures.  Compartmentalization of 
information in organizations leads to consequences remarkably like schizophrenia in individuals.  
Different units operate on different information and almost no one has “the big picture.”  So all 
kinds of confusion is the norm.  Furthermore, it is horrendously inefficient as each unit must 
scramble to understand important things independently. It has been noted that counterintelligence 
(CI) people are professional paranoids, because their work demands this.  What can one expect 
when their primary job is finding spies and other kinds of traitors?  They too must spy and lie in 
daily work, and are suspicious of everyone.  They study treason in detail and know they are 
looking not for common criminals, but for brilliant, highly resourced agents backed by 
governments with extensive training in how to avoid detection.   
 7 
          The larger system DEMANDS paranoiac behavior.  It REQUIRES reporting on neighbors, 
friends or others who might ask too many questions, even family in extremes.  It INSISTS that 
officers shred documents normal people would not blink at, guard data more scrupulously than a 
bank, and maintain complex ‘cover stories’ for any number of audiences.  This is all before 
putting someone in a dangerous, foreign context to commit crimes or even, more innocently, just 
to gather information for general intelligence (like reading papers at the embassy and attending 
those famous boozathons where disaffected, loose-lipped diplomats might be found). 
 
 Schizophrenia is more complicated than paranoia, but the core point is that “confused 
thinking” and “delusions” are mirrored by different agencies, which are generally NOT allowed 
to know what the others are doing.  For really spooky groups, this extends to a culture where you 
are not allowed to know what the other guy (or girl or android) in the next cubicle is doing, much 
less in the next agency, and the cafeteria is adorned with reminders that you are not to speak 
about work while you’re at work, much less in normal life (well not in the cafeteria anyway, 13).  
The original reason for such tight “information security” is so that when a “mole” penetrates 
your agency, they can’t learn much because almost no one inside knows what is going on outside 
of their tiny box. Foreign agents can then learn only tiny bits when they “turn” or exploit a traitor 
within.  The downside is phenomenal.  Confusion competes with intellectual rot and group-think. 
 
 Psychiatrists use a concept called “dissociative identity disorder” or more colloquially 
“multiple personalities” to discuss problems that arise when one person acts as though they have 
two distinct minds.  Spies under deep cover often experience similar problems keeping their real 
personalities intact while living (sometimes multiple) lies.  The agencies mirror this when excess 
compartmentalization has them working from very different sets of data about the world. 
 
 Consider this excerpt from an Oct. 16, 2003 article in Wired by Noah Schachtman:  “Our 
secrecy system is all about protecting security officers, and has nothing to do with protecting 
secrets.  It’s a self-licking ice cream cone,” said Rich Haver, until recently Donald Rumsfeld’s 
special assistant for intelligence, now with Northrup Grumman.  “We’re compartmentalizing the 
shit out of things.  It’s causing a total meltdown of our intelligence processes.”  (14)  When you 
compartmentalize information excessively, you prohibit both integration AND correction of 
errors.  You also impose enormous costs on the system and on the minds so afflicted. 
  
Compartmentalization, Bureaucracy and Worst Case Methods 
 
 The term for chopping integrated information into tiny bits is “compartmentalization” 
and the problem with this practice, in both individuals and in institutions, is that it makes getting 
“the big picture” really difficult.  At worst, it can drive you really nuts, because one box can have 
totally different information than the next box.  The right hand can frustrate the left, or much 
worse in covert operations with sometimes lethal consequences.  When only a few severely 
overworked senior administrators are “cleared” enough to look across the boxes, they don’t have 
time.  So then, no one really knows what is going on, or what the truth really is.  This difficulty 
is great within agencies; it is phenomenal across agencies that must deal simultaneously with 
grubby, mundane turf wars over budgets, egos, who’s in charge, what’s the policy (today?), etc.  
Loch Johnson (9, pg. 7) described that in this way: “The challenges of intelligence leadership are 
not isolated to the internal workings of the CIA.  Only a Yugoslavian definition of ‘community’ 
could apply to the baker’s dozen that comprise America’s intelligence establishment.”  
 
 Combine Balkanization of information with a herd of professional paranoids (the CI and 
security gangs) polygraphing everyone, others testing body fluids (the drug and biometric police) 
others vetting political views (the informal commissars whose parameters change with 
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administrations), the PC gang (infiltrating everywhere) with some very legitimate reasons to be 
afraid of other countries that have armies and real grievances (and to chop up critical national 
security information like detailed nuclear weapons designs) and you have a truly exquisite 
formula for mental distress.  Then comes “worst case analysis” which is a prudent form of 
planning endorsed by militaries through the ages. 
 
 Professional militaries certainly have good reasons to prepare for the worst.  They don’t 
like “Pearl Harbors” which kill thousands of their own people, or “9/11’s,” and they don’t want 
even one single nuclear weapon going off in any American city on their watch because someone 
did not take rare but real possibilities into proper account.  So they plan for the worst.  They are 
guardians of everything we value, and the best take this responsibility quite seriously. So they, 
and the IC which supports them, want everyone to err on the side of caution regarding both 
assessment of enemy capabilities and intentions, and in terms of “information security,” which is 
the root cause of that compartmentalization.  Thus comes the sacred “security clearance system” 
which reads like the loyalty codes of any highly controlling, paranoid, and exploitative cult. 
 
 Aristotle observed that any virtue carried to its furthest extreme can become a dangerous 
vice.  This is exactly what has happened in the American IC system.  Good goals, and good 
techniques of ‘tradecraft’ have been pushed for good reasons to extremes that are endangering 
America and the world.  More to the point of this essay, they tend to drive practitioners to mental 
illness, but since the whole thing is veiled by excessive secrecy the illnesses cannot be observed 
by outsiders or even, sometimes, by insiders who are the most thoroughly propagandized of all.  
Thus come the horrific ‘failures of intelligence’ that so many worry about, but none can solve. 
 
 A concrete example might help.  It is now recognized that intelligence regarding weapons 
of mass destruction in Iraq which led to the second Gulf War was at best highly flawed.  The NY 
Times provides these details (15).  Reports from “credible” sources indicating aggressive WMD 
programs in Iraq actually came from very dubious sources from an expatriate group that was 
explicitly trying to provoke war by the United States against the Hussein regime.  But to protect 
those sources, their identities were withheld even from most of the intelligence community.  The 
same source was sometimes described in different ways, so it looked to analysts like one report 
was being confirmed by another, even though they were echoes of one voice.  An insider term 
for this is “incestuous amplification.”  The DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) had discredited 
one of the main sources back in 2002, but because of compartmentalization, the CIA did not 
know that the man was a confirmed “fabricator.”  The politicized search for data to confirm a 
preconceived policy also led to creation of an “Office of Special Plans” in the Pentagon under 
Douglas Feith, to end run the skeptical DIA and CIA.  That office cherry-picked such items and 
fed them to VP Dick Cheney’s office who forwarded them to the President.  Shocking details on 
this are now provided by Col. K. Kwiatkowski who worked there (16).  Then President Bush, VP 
Cheney, and even Secretary of State Colin Powell gave eloquent, unhedged, and completely 
inaccurate accounts of the situation to many key audiences prior to the invasion of a sovereign 
nation, including the U.S. Congress, the United Nations and the American public.  ~ 10 million 
people protested worldwide on the eve of war, but the inner circle ignored them too.  Global 
opinion of America dropped like lead in the ocean, which has many serious consequences of its 
own.  A particularly grave consequence of this tragic failure of intelligence and of policy was the 
slaughter of very roughly 40,000 Iraqis, at least 10,000 of whom were civilians, and the deaths of 
590 American servicemen on the day of writing, with over 3,500 wounded.  No one knows when 
the casualty count will stop climbing, because no one knows when this war will really end. 
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The Security Clearance and Classification Systems 
 
 The “security clearance” is a ticket for employment, allowing one to work with 
“classified information.”  Both have legitimate rationales that have been carried to ridiculous 
extremes.  The Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy led by Senator 
Moynihan did a thorough job of documenting how excesses here actually make protecting the 
serious secrets more difficult, lead to vast recurring, annual expenses, undercut democracy, 
protect malfeasance, incompetence and frankly criminal behaviors, and have other serious 
negative consequences (17).  So I will focus on the security clearance piece of the puzzle here. 
 
 The core reason for a security clearance is straightforward.  Any spy agency or military 
unit needs to keep spies from other countries out of their candy store and munitions factories.  
How can you do this if you do not test for loyalty in some way?  The ways they choose today 
take months and anywhere from $25,000 per person, to upwards of $250,000 depending on just 
how “clear” the individual must be.  That is obviously quite expensive, and can take 9 months or 
more for the more select groups like the CIA, NSA or NRO.  There is no uniform system since 
each agency tends to think it has special reasons for special procedures to clear their personnel. 
 
 Far less obvious are a set of downsides I will simply list.  First, the very same procedures 
that weed out foreign spies also weed out some of the world’s most talented individuals.  They 
won’t put up with that BS.  Second, the very same procedures that weed out morally dubious 
individuals, weed out some of the most moral.  They won’t lie when the system requires this, and 
they won’t rat on their friends about petty things no matter how much the spooky CI or retired 
FBI guy who is checking them out wants to know.  Third, the system weeds out critics, people 
who question assumptions, think ‘outside the box’ or are too creative, since all of these qualities 
worry the bureaucrats in charge of security clearances.  That’s not good when you want to avoid 
stifling group-think, or to engage creative problem solvers.  Finally, and this may be the most 
pernicious effect of all, forever after the “clearance” puts a shackle on the mind so cleared, which 
must forever after censor what it says to others, who it listens to, and what it does in a diffuse, 
undefined array of areas, since no one really knows for sure WHAT their security officer will 
decide is a good reason to review one’s “security clearance.”  Without that clearance, your career 
is over.  The closest parallel to a professor’s life would be if one’s Ph.D., earned over many years 
of very hard labor, could be pulled at the whim of any number of faceless senior administrators 
or commissars of classified thinking.  Your whole career is at risk, so your whole life is 
diminished in service to the clearance without which employment (in the secret system) is 
impossible.  It turns into a thought control system that many cults would envy. 
 
 Long ago I studied the “Scientologists” of L. Ron Hubbard who also seek to be “clear.”  
Scientology is a large, successful cult that aspires to be a religion and has fought the government 
fiercely over who gets to define those terms.  In order to understand Scientology one must learn 
their inside vocabulary, for which one can buy whole books (many).  Spies also have inside 
jargons, so I own dictionaries of spookspeak too.  The parallels boggle the mind.  Scientologists 
get “clear” by spending thousands of dollars taking specialized classes on doctrine and being 
“audited” while holding a simple galvanometer that is renamed an “E-meter” for which the 
organization charges many hundreds of dollars.  Polygraph testing for CIA candidates involves 
galvanometers too.  And soothsayers who are called ‘polygraph examiners’ instead of ‘auditors’ 
ponder the squiggles seeking clues of inner truth, or at least of veracity.  This farce employs 
thousands of people every one of whom thinks they are doing terribly serious business for the 
good of all.  If any one of them dared to call it a farce, they would lose their career in a heartbeat.  
Spies can lie, and even fully cleared Scientologists can make mistakes; that’s OK.  But to speak 
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the truth, to say that the system is a farce, this is grounds for instant dismissal.  The emperor can 
tolerate many sins, a great many very grave sins if you look deeply into the system, but pointing 
out that he has no real clothes on, that is crossing a serious line – back to sanity – that cannot be 
ignored.  David Lykken wrote the definitive work on use and abuse of polygraphs in 1980 (18). 
 
“Need to Know” and “Ends vs. Means” 
 
 Two other principles of the stressful environment that spies and analysts work in further 
complicate challenges to intellectual acuity and moral balance.  These are “need to know” and 
“by any means necessary,” which is one answer to the ancient question of ends versus means.   
 
 The theory behind “need to know” is compartmenting information to discourage other 
spies.  You only get to know secrets if you “need” to know them for your job.  That must work 
OK for tiny jobs, but I guarantee it also stunts the minds so shackled.  In my own work, it would 
be crippling in two distinct ways.  First, it damages the ability to associate information from 
different places, times and conceptual domains.  That ability is essential for pattern recognition 
and discerning the meaning of big pictures and complex phenomena.  In agency lingo, “need to 
know” reduces the ability to “connect the dots.”  Second, I need to know … everything.  One of 
my jobs is information networking among scores of different domains and hundreds of people.  I 
don’t know on any day which requests will come my way.  So to do a good job, and to give good 
advice, I need to know as much as possible about everything including some sacred secrets. Most 
of those secrets are meaningless, archaic or trivial, but a small percentage are really important.  
Compartmentalization and its evil twin the “need to know” principle are anathema to those goals.   
 
 “By any means necessary” is a euphemism for ruthless, cruel, illegal and often immoral 
methods.  Anyone can think of scenarios, for example, where torture might be necessary to get 
time urgent information quickly in order to save a city of innocents from evil nuclear terrorists.  
And every soldier knows of situations where the laws of war may be bent to save their comrades’ 
lives.  It is less obvious that when people adopt the “ends justify the means” philosophy they can 
easily become agents for the dark side.  When everyone uses the rule “by any means necessary,” 
you live in a society where torture, theft and killing are common.  Then there is no longer any 
meaningful difference between the “terrorist” and the agents of the police-state.  Believe me, 
police-states are no fun to live in, and their agents use terror to control their populations.  They 
become actual terrorists.  Thus there is no dignity left for their warriors, nor joy for their peoples. 
 
Disinformation, Propaganda, PsyOps and Delusional Thinking 
 
 One of the main tools of spies is propaganda, and it has been so since the beginning of 
governments.  But ancient methods of controlling domestic audiences by control of information, 
or of influencing the behavior of other governments and of people by calculated lying, have been 
much enhanced since World War II.  Hitler’s infamous Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels 
was an amateur compared to the modern masters of mind control.  They often come from 
Madison Avenue, and they always study the techniques of modern advertising.  I have known the 
Army’s best and brightest, quite well, and can guarantee you they are most sincere.  Not always 
accurate, not by a long shot!  But they are sincere as the driven snow, and patriotic too. 
 
 Old-fashioned propaganda came in white, gray and black versions with whole books on 
technique, and schools to use them.  It was powerful enough.  But primitive propaganda has 
become a modern science called “psychological operations” which can be applied against entire 
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populations, or specific “targeted” individuals, with devastating effect depending on the balance 
of forces involved and especially on the degree of control over information sources.  Among the 
many tools of modern PsyOps (as practitioners like to call it) is disinformation. 
 
 Since every spy agency in the world knows about and sometimes uses “disinformation” 
analysts are trained to beware of it.  Since every spy agency in the world, but especially the CIA, 
maintains extensive contacts with journalists in almost every medium, analysts develop a 
generally healthy skepticism about press reports that could have been planted by their enemies.  
But like everything else in spooky-luky land, this healthy skepticism can morph into extremes 
that isolate the analyst or operator, and slowly drive them nuts. 
 
 Some earlier comments on how this works among the Scientologists are appropriate here, 
and some to come about the Moonies too.  But you don’t have to be a cult enthusiast or member 
of a fundamental sect to be vulnerable to the dangers of single sourcing and unquestionable 
truths.  You can also be a normal human being who just accepts advice to regard only your 
agency’s publications as authoritative, and all other sources suspect due to the prevalence of 
“disinformation” and it’s cousins “misinformation,” propaganda and simple human errors of 
every kind.  Once you read only the approved publications, or talk only to “cleared” people, you 
are at great risk of delusional thinking.  Sociologists labeled this form “group-think” long ago. 
 
 One final note on this.  Many genuinely mentally ill people are prone to “conspiracy 
theories” and to other aspects of truly paranoid thought.  But spyworld and its allies in the media 
also recognized early on that this truth, like many others, could be exploited to their advantage.  
Thus many perfectly accurate perceptions of covert manipulation of information and events are 
quickly dismissed by both media and agencies as fevered thinking by “conspiracy theorists” or 
“buffs.”  But what is a spy agency if not an organized conspiracy to gather information about the 
world and to influence it “covertly” by secret propaganda and “covert actions?”  In America 
there is a whole body of law about such things, and $35 billion annual budgets!  Other countries 
do this too.  To think that conspiracies never happen is as silly as to think they always do.  The 
most successful propaganda campaign in history was the one that convinced so many otherwise 
intelligent people that organized conspiracies seldom exist, and that evil is not real.   
 
 It has been said that truth is the first casualty of war, and that the truth will set you free.  
Inability to discern truth is also a first step to serious mental illness.  Propaganda is a systematic 
effort to distort truth, promoted by governments with great resources at their disposal.  Be aware. 
 
MKULTRA, Paperclip, Coups, Assassinations and other Skeletons in the Closet …  
… that live on to Haunt You 
 
 No matter how pure and good the new recruit, they will encounter some consequences of 
history.  MKULTRA was a vast research program on mind control methods conducted mainly in 
the 1950’s and 60’s due to fears about North Korean “brainwashing” techniques.  It involved “at 
least 150 research projects” (19, pages 8, 185, and 838-9, original source CIA) conducted at scores 
of major American Universities (including one I teach at, the University of Minnesota) at least one 
Canadian University and several offshore locations.  Their results were so disturbing that then-DCI 
Richard Helms claimed he had the files burned shortly before Senator Frank Church began the 
most probing review of American Intelligence ever (7).  For a measure of how disturbing, at least 
one project involved systematic torture of small children to see if useful mental illnesses could be 
induced so that later in life they could become exceptional assassins, or couriers whose secret 
information was buried in personality alters that could not be revealed even under more torture. 
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 A single example from a different genre, clandestine drug testing, at my University will 
suffice here.  A psychometrist code-named Mary Ray testified to another Senate Committee on 
Nov. 7, 1975 that a 17 yr. old minor, mildly disturbed psychiatric out-patient was chosen as subject 
for unwitting LSD experimentation.  She was hospitalized, then subjected to at least 10 sessions of 
massive doses of LSD (2,000 micrograms, about ten times a street dose) until she was rendered 
catatonic for 4 days (20).  The psychometrist recalled a Nazi-like doctor ordering aides to drag the 
screaming patient into the experimental areas towards the end of this macabre perversion of 
scientific method.  I have no doubt that all involved except the unwitting patient who had come for 
help sincerely believed that America “needed to know” for some urgent, national security reason.  
 
 Whether this doctor was a genuine Nazi doctor or just a zealous researcher is unknown to 
me, or her.  That America had imported hundreds of genuine Nazi doctors, engineers and scientists 
prior to this period is without a doubt.  That story is also admitted by the CIA, and recorded in 
books about “Project Paperclip” (21) and by the Commission on Human Radiation Experiments 
among other sources.  This notorious operation was part of early Cold War competition between 
the Soviet Union and America over who would get the most value from Hitler’s surviving 
scientists.  Our most famous immigrant under this program was Dr. Wernher Von Braun, father of 
our ICBM program.  The Nazi medical doctors avoided publicity for fairly obvious reasons. 
 
 Resulting crimes of MKULTRA were so egregious that they offended even extremely 
hardened operators who had gone through the trials and compromises of World War II, like 
Richard Helms and the subsequent DCI William Colby, so some reforms were actually instituted 
after the Pike Committee and Church Committee investigations of CIA abuses in the mid-1970’s.  
These reforms included creating a “Congressional oversight system” which (while virtually 
toothless) is still better than nothing.  A congressman very close to that told me personally that the 
real job was to “overlook, not to oversee.”  But the point of this brief section is to observe that 
regardless of who is to blame or what “corrective measures” are taken, such crimes resonate for 
generations to haunt even the most sincere and innocent intelligence analyst 30 and 50 years later. 
 
Why the damage resonates over time may be easier to understand with coups, murders and 
political assassinations.  Two of the earliest big “success stories” of the CIA were coups in Iran 
(1953) and Guatemala (1954) accomplished on low budgets by covert paramilitary, political, 
economic and psychological operations.   To this day millions of Iranians and Guatemalans, 
therefore, hate America to the bone because they do not forget murders of their loved ones or 
destruction of their national economies so easily as the operators in Washington do, or that 
dormant American public which is deliberately deceived (and targeted) by the secrecy system. 
 
Iranians have neighbors too, and many Latin countries far beyond Guatemala have felt the 
force of US covert operations including lovely details like training police of military governments 
in techniques of “interrogation” that anyone else would call torture, sponsoring death squads, etc. 
(22).  So CIA agents in Muslim and Latin countries fear for their lives today because of things that 
happened decades ago.  This is true regardless of what they are doing now, and of course, they do 
not say.  So, suspicious minds will always infer that the embassy spies are continuing their evil old 
ways.  A long history of subverting democracy and abusing human rights in poorer, weaker 
countries resonates to the detriment even of ordinary tourists generations later.  To the point of this 
essay, that real history puts a serious strain on the most innocent mind that enters the CIA today.  
Brilliant people enter the agency every day, but as a group they appear* almost as ignorant of the 
real history of US foreign policy as the college students I work with every day.  *(small sample)  
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 On murders and assassinations, retreat into legalistic hairsplitting is the agency norm, 
which convinces no one but themselves.  Many times I have heard official CIA representatives 
admit that, well yes, they did try to kill a VERY FEW foreign leaders LONG ago, like Fidel Castro 
of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, but that these efforts failed and that the practice was 
forbidden in 1976 by President Ford.  Ronald Reagan reinforced this ban with Executive Order 
#12333 in 1983.  Such denials are somewhat pathetic since there is zero doubt that the agency 
sponsored whole armies years later (like the Contra’s of Nicaragua during the mid-1980’s) that 
killed tens of thousands of people.  The agency also published whole books on “Psychological 
Operations in Guerrilla Warfare” (23) that described who to select for assassination (for maximum 
propaganda effect).  These were distributed to tens of thousands of covert soldiers.  The CIA 
maintains today a Special Operations Group (SOG) of paramilitary commandos, … for what?  To 
suck their thumbs and draw pensions?  Not likely during this ‘war on terrorism’ that claims victims 
all around the world.  They recently bragged about nailing one of their targets with a Hellfire 
missile fired from an unmanned Predator aircraft over Yemen (a technical coup) and presumed the 
5 other people in his car were bad boys too.  Do the PR people think we are all morons? 
 
These special operations, most of which are quite small and many of which employ the US 
Army Special Forces, or the Delta force, or Navy Seal Team 6, rather than dedicated CIA “SOG’s” 
continue in over 100 countries in a typical year.  These “Ops” are kept secret from the American 
public, but they are never secret to the victims’ families. Sometimes the victims are really bad men 
who are unloved.  Sometimes not.  Often they are mixed, both good, bad and utterly innocent.  We 
blew up 80 people in Beirut one day years ago, trying to get one bad mullah who escaped.  Either 
way their relatives record the crimes, their neighbors attend to what happened just like you would, 
and some of them share the resulting hatred with Americans who come back to tell us what really 
happened.  In the worst cases they kill Americans in retribution, many of whom had absolutely 
nothing to do with the original sins.  Thus do secret crimes resonate through time. 
 
Many books have been written about this secret history of American foreign policy, some 
by fierce critics of the CIA (like William Blum, whose “CIA: A Forgotten History” is a classic, 24) 
others by career veterans of the CIA (like John Stockwell, a former agency station chief in Angola 
who revealed much about covert support for a civil war there – and about the Lumumba murder – 
in, “In Search of Enemies,” 25).  But my point here is not repeating that tragic and sometimes 
sordid history.  My point is emphasizing its effect on the morale and the mental health of 
intelligence professionals today, both analysts and operators, in whatever agency they work for. 
 
When they sign that non-disclosure agreement to keep secrets sacred, they do not just agree 
to keep legitimate secrets like nuclear weapons designs or military deployments.  They agree to 
keep secret  EVERY crime they may ever witness or hear about under penalty of law.  Sure, they 
may report malfeasance to the black hole of internal affairs offices that almost never do anything 
about them (at considerable risk to the whistleblower’s career and occasionally life, of course).  
But telling such secrets to the American public is a crime the secret system takes much more 
seriously than, for example, killing foreign nationals in covert actions.  Revealing secrets to the 
public is considered almost as serious as outright treason, and is treated very harshly. 
 
This environment puts a serious strain on any intelligent, healthy, educated and once 
empathetic mind with a conscience.  Most people enter this field with sincerely good intentions.  
But a great strain gets put on their minds the day they really join the brother and sisterhood of 
clandestine service, which presents some very severe consequences over the long term. 
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Parallels with the Priesthood 
 
 Spies and analysts are not the first group of people to grapple with grave moral dilemmas, 
with high stress occupations, or with crime among the ranks of a secretive brotherhood.  So in 
my quest for solutions to close this essay, I will look for a moment at another group of ‘special’ 
people that is dealing with serious criticism and morale problems during these difficult times.  
Those are clergy, and specifically Roman Catholic Priests in America today.  Every day I see 
more than most people do, since I also teach at a Catholic University about 100 meters from a 
seminary where priests-to-be are trained. 
 
 As everyone now knows, they have had an exceptional problem with pedophiles and 
pedophilia among the ranks during the last century.  As important, their system which was 
undoubtedly founded on moral principles conspired to cover up thousands of cases of this crime 
by thousands of priests over many, many years (26).  Thus the blame was spread from the 
relatively few egregious sinners to all those tens of thousands of other priests who knew, but 
observed their vows of obedience to the hierarchy and were silent as pedophile priests were 
bounced from one parish to another, or from job to job within the same church jurisdiction.  It is 
a system of secrecy and submission very much like the bureaucratic world that spies live in (27). 
 
 There are quite a few other significant parallels between these two groups, priests and 
spies, so I will simply list them now. 
 
--  Both are exceptionally dedicated to the welfare of their institutions, and to their missions,  
which are theoretically and sometimes in fact dedicated to the good of all.   
--  Both must work very hard to become certified members of their groups.  
--  Both learn extensive internal languages, rules, and rituals. 
--  Both must utter strict vows of secrecy and obedience to a leadership hierarchy with long 
traditions as a condition for employment by the brotherhood. 
--  Both recognize that no humans are perfect, including themselves, but try to do good anyway, 
 albeit in different ways.  Their images of human evil may be very different, however. 
--  Both historically were almost exclusively male, although the spy world has always had  
more room for women than the Roman Catholic priesthood.  Neither has coped very well 
with the feminist revolution.  The priests do have sister nuns, in ever shrinking numbers, 
and the church engages many other devoted religious women, just in different ways. 
--  Both must forswear virtually all vices except for alcohol, smoking and overeating, and both 
are subject to abrupt dismissal if caught violating that rule (e.g. for using illegal drugs). 
Priests, of course, are supposed to be 100% celibate; spies very seldom are.  A difference!  
But less than one might expect, because some spies are celibate too, and few priests 100%. 
--  Both work very long, very hard hours with many sometimes stressed-out clients, parishioners,  
or colleagues, and both often get involved with difficult problems of those other people. 
--  When faced with moral crises that could bring scandal to their institutions, both are duty 
bound to bring these observations to, and only to, other representatives of the institution. 
--  Both are supposed to handle confidential information with extreme discretion, risking even  
life and limb should other authorities try to squeeze it from them.  Secrecy is sacred. 
--  And finally, both must subscribe to some “party line” beliefs that are obviously untrue.   
          Among priests an example could be the doctrine of papal infallibility on various questions; 
among American spies it could be the allegedly noble intentions of American foreign policy.  No 
matter how silly such things may seem to outsiders, they must be maintained at all times or you 
can be drummed out of the sacred club.  Subscribing to and publicly maintaining silly things that 
are obviously untrue has some other, rather serious consequences to the mind so bound.  
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 Spies are more variable in this respect than priests, and obviously work for different 
countries with different party lines.  But most subscribe to some version of national security 
worship which serves the same basic function of sealing nearly unquestionable obedience to the 
command hierarchy that sustains them and sometimes serves a larger good for their society. 
 
Since almost no-one can really live up to all those restrictions all of the time, both groups 
are also exceptionally forgiving of members who lapse.  Both also involve large numbers of 
people who devote nearly every waking hour and fiber they can in service to their communities 
and to their institutions.  Really, if you get to know spies and priests very well as I have, you 
know for sure that many are exceptionally idealistic people who really do exemplify service to 
larger goods and goals.  But still, still, most of them will also protect brothers in their midst who 
injure the innocent, even repeatedly.  These are brotherhoods of the tightly bonded kind, very 
exclusive brotherhoods with stressful jobs and high moral goals.  But the vows of secrecy and 
nearly blind obedience get them into very serious trouble.  How can we restore the honor which 
should come to people who sacrifice so much in the service of larger goods? 
 
Previous efforts at Reform, Citizens as Enemies, and Good People in Evil Systems 
 
 When former Director of the NSA, Gen. William Odom did his best to fix this (1, p2) he 
wrote: “After almost three decades of such episodes [major intelligence failures], no fundamental 
reform has occurred.  Virtually all congressional investigations and reform studies have merely 
focused on the scandals and raised policy issues.”  When Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
decorated by the CIA for exemplary service to the secret world in his youth, devoted his last days 
to exposing the corrosive effects of excessive government secrecy in 1997 (17) he despaired that 
needed change could occur because bureaucratic interests had historically obstructed all reforms.  
In the end, he called “for abolition of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and a fundamental 
restructuring of the entire intelligence community.” (9, page 1).   When huge counterintelligence 
scandals were revealed by the treasons of Aldrich Ames (CIA/CI), Robert Hanssen (FBI/CI), and 
Jonathan Pollard (Office of Naval Intelligence, or ONI) people murmured that there must be 
something wrong, but very little actually happened to correct that.  IC-21 came and went without 
effect (3), the Aspen-Brown Commission (4), pithy papers were published by the CFR (5) and 
other brainy intel-NGOs (6), all to be ignored.  In every case obsession with secrecy about topics 
sacred to the bureaucracy trumped cleaning up the mess to protect America.  
 
 Many critics both inside and outside the IC have noted that “classification” can cover 
incompetence, waste, sloth, theft and criminal behavior up to and including treason as easily as it 
can cover legitimate national security secrets.  And it does.  For a really scathing review of these 
issues, you might read 25 year intelligence veteran Robert D. Steele’s “On Intelligence” (28, 
version 1.4 of October 11, 2003).  He writes there that:  “9-11 was both an intelligence failure 
and a policy failure.  It continues to trouble me that in the two years prior to 9-11, capping 
decades of Presidential and Congressional commissions on intelligence reform, no fewer than 15 
books on intelligence deficiencies and intelligence reform were published.  All were ignored.” 
 
Despite a string of failures that would embarrass the most self-centered professor, the 
zealots of security hold forth for classifying everything on the theory that this is the safest path.  
“Better ‘safe’ than sorry!” the professional paranoids and worst case analysts proclaim.  Steele 
calls them the security gremlins, and wants them put back in the closet.  What they cannot see 
clearly is that this practice induces paranoia, not just professional, but clinical.  Bureaucrats 
concur with the urge to classify for other reasons, because openness invites questions from the 
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prying public and those intolerably curious media types.  ‘Look how much FOIA has cost us, 
neutered though it is?,’ they say.  (FOIA is the Freedom of Information Act, a great idea that has 
been gutted by the gremlins and the latest wave of official hysteria).  Openness threatens budgets 
– can’t have that!  And who has time for pesky oversight committees anyway?  There is not time 
or money on this earth to answer all the questions from a prying public (they will say), which 
certainly does include some hostile spies.  Even administrations in polite society (like churches!) 
are loath to open their files to outsiders, and they all have reasons, some quite legitimate.  Others 
hide their pedophiles this way.  Some secrets really are important (like sources, some methods, 
ongoing operations, nuclear weapons designs and SIOPs [plans for nuclear war], or recipes for 
other WMDs).  Why not be ‘safe’ and just classify everything?  Good answers are because:   a)  
it drives you nuts, b) it reduces the accuracy of your conclusions, c) it’s outrageously expensive, 
and, d) it fundamentally undercuts democracy. 
 
In the short run, it is much easier for the cleared nuts to dismiss critics as simple-minded 
fools or dupes of the great conspiracy among our enemies to undercut domestic support through 
artful disinformation campaigns.  In the long run, by this process you are doomed.  Since 
disinformation is certainly a tool of tradecraft, and since real evidence exits of actual enemies 
using those tools we know so well (from ordinary propaganda to sophisticated PsyOps) it is 
really easy in the short run to just pretend that critical Americans are simply misguided and that 
some are traitors, manipulating the rest.  Citizens become enemies in the eyes of the state.  When 
the CIA last adopted this attitude, it “generated a data bank on 1.5 million U.S. citizens, many of 
whom had their mail intercepted and read in clear violation of the law. No one was safe: not 
Richard Nixon, not Leonard Bernstein, not John Steinbeck, not Arthur Burns – all of whom had 
their mail opened.  The FBI launched 500,000 investigations of so-called subversives (mainly 
Vietnam War and civil rights activists, with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., a primary target), 
without a single court conviction; the NSA monitored every cable sent overseas, or received, by 
Americans; and Army intelligence units conducted investigations against 100,000 American 
citizens during the Vietnam War era, including members of the Urban Coalition, the Anti-
Defamation League, and that hotbed of insurrection – the Chamber of Commerce.” (9, page 13).  
Now, the IC wants “Total Information Awareness” renamed by the Pentagon as “Terrorist 
Information Awareness” to preserve funding for the new, data-mining and fusion technologies 
that make an illegal paper file on citizens unnecessary, since electronic files can now be created 
on anyone in seconds by supercomputers drawing on thousands of public and private databases.  
   
When I studied the Moon organization (a.k.a. the Unification Church of the “Reverend” 
Sun Myung Moon) they accomplished this same goal by liaison with intelligence agencies 
world-wide, sharing data on potential enemies (always of the political left by some miraculous 
coincidence) and by defining critics as “agents of Satan,” sent to damage the “heaven-sent” 
Moon group.  “Disinformation” and “Satanic Inspiration” work exactly the same in the minds of 
those who are desperate to deny information that could challenge their profoundly dysfunctional 
worldviews.  It keeps the truth at bay so that cult leaders can more easily control their disciples.  
In the long run the disciples become mentally ill, their families suffer, and their organizations 
decay due to systemic inability to respond to corrective feedback from the real world. 
 
I stress here that I do not say that EVERYONE in the spy world is sick or dysfunctional.     
I do say that the system induces illness in various ways.  The Catholic Church discovered only 4% 
of priests were pedophiles (in America).  But that 4% caused deep harm to all the rest, because the 
system they work in implicates all who preserve the secrecy essential for such crimes to continue. 
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          Figure 22 illustrates another significant part of this problem (29, pg. 118).  Systems matter.  
“’The turning of a few valves can mean the difference between a pharmaceutical company and a 
chemical or biological plant.’ said the Agency’s leading proliferation specialist.” (in 9, page 3)  
You can put 100% exemplary people into an evil system, and if information controls are artful 
those good people will chug away doing excellent, hard-working, first-class work … for evil.  In 
their heads, they will be super-patriots, and the best will sacrifice even life itself.  Many will 
sacrifice families, since the work is ‘so urgent’ and the management so indifferent to real welfare 
among workers’ families, or to squishy concepts like love, God, or genuine patriotism.  Nazi 
Germany provided many examples of the good German worker serving evil ends, but Stanley 
Milgram (30) and the Mormon Church among many others have shown that “good Germans” are 
everywhere.  Good Germans, in fact, are just good workers – exceptionally good workers who 
strive to please by doing exactly what they are told without excess questions or introspection. 
 
 Lest I offend everyone unnecessarily, a few words on the good German phenomenon 
might help here.  We are ALL vulnerable to this, because we are ALL social creatures with some 
desire to conform.  This was indispensable to early tribal groups that depended on each other for 
survival.  Being social creatures, we calibrate our moral compasses by reference to the social 
group around us and its moral leaders.  When your moral leaders and creators of institutional 
structure include deeply disturbed individuals like James “Jesus” Angleton (the previously noted 
and spectacularly paranoid former chief of Counterintelligence at CIA), you are at serious risk.  
Isolation from other worldviews by exaggerated fears for “information security,” and concepts 
like “disinformation” or “Satanic influence” encapsulate the dysfunction, and prevent correction. 
 
 This is the basic mechanism by which genuinely good, hard-working, sincere people who 
often call themselves Christians * can, with the best of intentions, be co-opted by evil systems.    
* (In America these will usually be Christians, but in MOSSAD these will be especially devout 
Jews and in Arab Mukhabarats [secret police] they are especially devout Muslims.  Another 
thing learned long ago was that people in morally stressful occupations often adopt especially 
devout religious practices for compensation and frankly, relief from the stress.)  Subsequent 
control mechanisms by the organization reinforce the fears, the penalties for talking to outsiders, 
the paranoia, black-white thinking, and ultimately the desire to conform.  It is a mind control 
regime well understood by cults, and studied closely by the CIA during the MKULTRA days.   
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How to Escape the Insanity, Without Blowing Your Career (totally) 
 
 Tomorrow the sun will rise, the rain will fall somewhere, and our nation will desperately 
need a healthy intelligence community for many reasons.  Tens of thousands of people will come 
to work at the 15 or so agencies, and enter a system that makes it almost impossible to do a good 
job.  What to do?  What to do to fix these problems, and to restore a healthy relationship between 
polite society and the warriors who exist to protect us (31)?  Michael Warner wrote the most 
eloquent essay on differing definitions of intelligence I have seen (32) but Arthur Hulnick put it 
more succinctly: “Intelligence is a weapon of war.”  We are certainly at war now, for good 
reasons and for bad ones.  But the past is prologue; all that matters now, is now and the future. 
 
 The first step to solving any problem is recognizing that there is indeed a problem.  
Many, many people have tried to tell you that there is a serious problem in the IC, including 
many thoroughly vetted, extremely “cleared” insiders.  Listen to them more, deny less; then act. 
If you’ve read this far you could infer that actually adopting some of those hundreds of 
recommendations from serious panels of vetted experts would be good. But most important of all 
is Steele’s recommendation to ‘put the security gremlins back in the closet.’ They are a central 
part of your problem.  With the best of intentions, they are destroying our intelligence system. 
 
 Third, you should invite me over to wander around and ask questions of many people – 
without requiring that non-disclosure agreement which I will not sign.  Yes, I am not joking.  
Most of my adult life I have taken significant risks in the service of our country, and I understand 
discretion.  But you (as a system) have become so obsessed with getting “cleared” you can’t 
think clearly anymore.  Like a drunk in the gutter, some of you think the answer is to drink more 
of that “clear” stuff.  Not so.  If you can’t get that basic truth, then you will continue to deny 
reality, exclude constructive critics, and deflect most of those hundreds of other attempts to fix 
the system, or at least to make it better.  “Intelligence” should be about knowing what is going 
on, and understanding what to do in difficult circumstances, not  JUST  keeping secrets.  Most of 
those secrets are junk anyway, and you know it.  All of your worst traitors were thoroughly 
“clear” and some of your best allies won’t do that dumb stuff. 
 
 I will spend just a few more paragraphs here repeating just a few of the most important 
recommendations of very clear others for improvement of the system as it is.  But the radical 
changes necessary are as cited above, and it’s important not to get lost in repeating old details. 
 
 First, system issues.  It is obvious that technical collection gobbles up more money than 
any serious cost/benefit analysis would recommend compared to human intelligence and the 
broader areas of language and area studies. Odom says the NRO serves more as a conduit of cash 
for the aerospace industry than as anything innovative or even very useful these days, and Steele 
would go further (27).  The vast majority of traffic intercepted by the NSA is never translated 
and goes unanalyzed, but the billion dollar a pop vacuum cleaners in the sky scoop it all up 
regardless.  There are always more, and more expensive, technical collectors in the pipeline.  He 
also observes that most of what you really want to know is not in English, not on the web, and is 
often not written down at all.  As important as increasing budgets for HUMINT, the community 
would benefit by rethinking the concept of national security itself, to move it closer to the UN’s 
concept of human security.  When 9/11 happened, the headlines were full of variations on “Why 
do they Hate us so much?”  To ask that question is to reveal the kind of deep ignorance that fails 
to notice other little issues like the collapse of the Soviet Union.  They hate us because our 
foreign policy is selfish and cruel.  Who does not know that today?  Apparently the intelligence 
community of the USA.  If you are missing that, you are missing many other important things. 
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 Thorough reviews of the issues faced by analysts and attempts to improve their training 
can be had from Jack Davis, the dean of intelligence training today (33) or Steven Marrin who 
has spent time inside, but is now working for the GAO and writing papers about how the Kent 
Center for intelligence analysis is trying to improve training on that side of the CIA (34, 35).  
Carol Dumaine, head of the Global Futures Partnership, is rumored to be among the best of the 
new generation, but almost all her stuff is classified so what can I know?   I have no idea how to 
fix the deeply broken DO, and could not venture a guess without much better inside information.  
If you’d let me in to look around I could do you some good – we have a great deal in common 
after all.  But I won’t agree to,  a) damage my mental abilities doing the spooky-luky dance, or   
b) cover up serious crimes in progress.  I don’t care about the past – it is now and the future that 
concerns me.  And it is not about me – it’s about your inability to deal with information that 
exposes your dark side and your blind spots.  If you don’t like me, invite someone else in who 
will tell you the things you need to know, instead of just echoing what you want to hear. 
  
 Second, personal issues.  If you are an average member of the IC today (whatever that is) 
you are probably already addicted to the big salary that seems so small, coping with a mortgage 
and maybe a couple of kids (or alimony) in a high cost neighborhood, and have already invested 
years of your life preparing for this career.  Bailing out is seldom an option, even if you discover 
you are working in a toxic, unhealthy mental environment due to the security gremlins and their 
demonic acolytes.  But I don’t want you to bail out anyway.  We need good people in the IC.  
What I want you to do is to push that security envelope hard as you can without losing your job.  
I want you to leak a little more to our democratic media, so that the general public can get a clue 
what is going on, and what is truly wrong, without leaking the serious stuff that could actually 
endanger either the public or your special sources.  That is a delicate business, of course.  But if 
senior politicians and their staffs can do this every day, why not you?  Why can’t you decide 
what is truly significant, and when it is better kept secret or better made public?  They can’t fire 
everybody.  So I say, tell your gremlin to get a life and remember, we were born in a democracy, 
not a police-state.  For a less daring option, join Robert D. Steele’s little gang of intelligence 
“rebels” at OSS.net.  They have an annual conference in Washington D.C. each spring, and are 
trying in myriad ways to promote an open sources revolution which is one step toward the larger 
goal.  Yes, he has stepped on many very clear toes.  But he is pointed in the right direction, and 
has the cajones to challenge the nuts who most need challenging. 
 
 I would like to close by quoting several comments made by the current Deputy Director 
of Intelligence at CIA, Ms. Jami A. Miscek in her speech of February 11, 2004 to “All-Hands” 
present in the CIA auditorium that day (36).  These are excerpted in order, with a few comments 
in brackets [ ] to make my points. 
 
 “Our Agency and our Directorate are taking a lot of criticism these days.  In fact, Agency 
veterans to whom I have spoken say they haven’t seen anything like it since Vietnam, or since the period 
in the mid-1970s when the Church committee was investigating the Agency.” 
 “Our integrity goes hand-in-hand with our analytic objectivity.  There is nothing more 
fundamental or important than our mandate to ‘call it as we see it.’  It is a core value – not just of the DI 
but of the CIA.  This is the foundation upon which we do our work – it must be protected at all costs.” 
 “A commitment to constant improvement is also one of our core values.” 
 “I would say that the men and women who work in the Directorate are the most talented group of 
individuals anyone could ever hope to lead.  And, I am lucky enough to know that first-hand.” 
 “We assess the physical or mental health of a world leader without ever meeting or touching the 
patient.”  [Indeed, just as I am assessing you and your colleagues now, except that I’ve met many over the 
years, and touched them too.  You certainly are a talented group of people.  But your system is also ill.] 
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 “When it comes to foreign intelligence there should be no such thing as DI and DO information, 
it is Agency information.” … “If you work the issue, you need to know the information.  Period.” 
 “The DCI has given the EXDIR 30 days to devise a permanent and lasting solution.” 
 “Today, I am announcing a senior DI officer as my Special Advisor for Analytic Tradecraft.  He 
will have full access to all of my substantive meetings and direct access to me.”  [OK, great, but this is 
like the Pope assigning a Cardinal to tell him his flaws.  They share the most intimate set of blind spots 
vetted over decades of common assumptions.  You must go further in the direction of your wise words.] 
 “A final area I want to focus on is the danger of inherited assumptions.” … “There are critical 
assumptions that underlie the answers to such questions; we need to know what they are, to rigorously 
examine them, and, at all costs, we must avoid group-think.”  [Indeed, Amen, Roger that!] 
 “Doing sophisticated, in-depth, value-added analysis requires a dialogue. … Be courageous.  And 
remember, we are not preempting your role as analysts when we question your judgments, we are executing 
our responsibilities as DI managers.”  [As I am exercising a responsibility of American citizens … by 
nagging you.] 
 “This is that serious.  We cannot move forward without a thorough review of our tradecraft and 
where we find it falls short, we must find immediate solutions.”  [So call me.] 
 “We will enhance our expertise and broaden our point of view by reaching out to others, employing 
contrarian analyses, and perhaps most importantly by expanding the diversity of our workforce.”   [Really?  
Does this mean you are really going to bag the archaic security clearance system, or seriously modify it?    
If not, your “diversity” will remain intellectually sterile and functionally weak, brilliant though you are.] 
 
 When the Catholic Church went through its embarrassing time of trials it was essential to 
bring in real outsiders; not just consultants cleared by the same gang that caused the problems. 
 
 You all have my deepest sympathy.  You do an amazingly important job under almost 
unbelievably difficult circumstances.  And we need you to do better despite all obstacles.  It is 
quite ridiculous for me to try to diagnose such difficult problems in such a complex system as 
yours from the outside of a vast information barrier specifically created to make seeing clearly 
difficult.  Seeing clearly is my business, but your defenses are impressive.  This is the best I can 
do so long as your system fears critical truth so much as it does today.  If you want serious 
advice, you should let me in warts and all, to check things out.  Then I could certainly tell you 
better what is broken and suggest practical ways to fix those problems.  Best wishes always, 
 
Michael Andregg,  mmandregg@stthomas.edu 
Justice and Peace Studies at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. 
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Reactions to the first draft from spies and spooky-luky* guys approached around ISA-04 
 
 The very first comment I got, from a career, senior analyst/operator in a responsible position 
was to drop the “spooky-luky land” stuff.  Well, sure, it won’t do any good at all for me to mock my 
primary audience. But that is not the point. I have dropped it from most locations, not all, and offer a 
few additional words of explanation.  First, the environment that spies and analysts work in is a very 
bizarre environment with 37 varieties of terrain and creatures in that.  I need some term smaller than 
a paragraph to describe it.  So sometimes I use “spooky-luky land” and “spies” generically.  Second, 
 
37.  “Spooky-luky” is a term I use in memory of CWO Bill McCoy, a career CID investigator (Criminal Investigations  
Division, US Army) who devoted his retirement to helping spies unfairly punished by their systems for trying to 
do the right thing (often speaking truth to power when that was called for by the U.S. Constitution).  He used 
this term when describing the excesses that led some ‘true believers’ into doing really stupid things like killing 
their colleagues.  Believe me, things can get MUCH worse than just confused during covert operations. 
 
 Second, there was a very noticeable difference between reactions from Americans vs. non-
Americans.  The former with some exceptions were disturbed that I would write about such things, 
the latter cheered me on in various ways.  Whether you agree with my conclusions or not, you can be 
certain that much of the world is wondering what has got into American intelligence today.  ???! 
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 I will consider the critics first.  The editor of a very prestigious journal for professional spies 
rejected my manuscript in approximately 2 minutes saying it was unsustainable, sources were bad, 
unnuanced, and so forth.  Well there’s no doubt it is less ‘nuanced’ than most third person, sanitized 
discussions of the business!  What he had time to see was, a) the topic was taboo and unsettling, b) 
that in addition to fully certifiable, 100% insider citations, I also drew on some of the forbidden (or 
‘discredited’) sources, and c) that I certainly violated the third person rule of academic prose and of 
abstracting human consequences out.  These are all quite true, and I would probably have fallen over 
dead from shock if he’d accepted this manuscript at this time.  But he also admitted, without any 
hesitation, that I was on to real problems.  It was style and sources that annoyed him, not any doubt 
that problems of stress and psychiatric consequences were real.  In fact, most of my American critics 
agree that the problems are real, just not discussable.  Finally, his standard for sources would have 
been entirely CIA approved psychiatric reports which are of course not available (I tried) thereby 
rendering the topic undiscussable by the unwashed.  Thus do secret problems fester unresolved. 
 
 Another gentleman with almost 40 years experience in the DI including very high level jobs 
indeed (whom I’ve known for many years) was extremely disappointed and wondered whether I had 
just dreamed this up one night.  No, but that’s OK.  Years ago, he also could not believe the agency 
was ever involved in drug running. Three years of sponsoring panels on agency drug running did not 
convince him. Even when the CIA’s inspector general published a report (F. Hitz, in 1998) admitting 
54 namable CIA assets had been involved in narcotics trafficking from Central America, this friend 
still defended the point that this was not “policy” but just “bad apples.”  The argument that every 
institution has some problems is always true, and the Catholic Church used it for decades to deflect 
the pedophilia problem.  What my distinguished friend cannot see, because he loves his institution 
so, is that this is not  JUST a bad apple issue, and that it injures many more people than he observes. 
 
 A colleague of his with even more experience (not at the conference, by mail) gave a nice 
technical review, absolutely lacking in affect.  This one has seen it all, and corrected some technical 
errors in my writing like it was just another analysis headed for the black hole that consumes most 
such papers in the agency.  Meaning did not seem to matter much; method was everything. But I 
appreciate all critics.  Several operators, and people with operational experience, took my paper 
without a word of comment, as they usually do.  We shall see if pearls of wisdom or critique ensue. 
 
 One had a remarkable story.  He wanted to marry a foreign national.  This is not rare in the 
DO, since they spend so much time overseas with such generous expense accounts, but it requires 
serious scrutiny by their security overseers for obvious reasons.  This 15 year veteran waited through 
18 months of polygraph exams, background checks, and what he ultimately regarded as abusive and 
repetitive treatment all allegedly to MAKE SURE he was not marrying a foreign spy.  The country 
of origin is relevant, but must be withheld along with other details to protect this source.  However, 
in the end he resigned from the DO of the CIA because of explicit and energetic opposition to the 
human act of getting married.  This is one small, tangible datum to the point of this essay.  Needless 
to say, he left the CIA as one very unhappy camper which adds to the angst of those left behind. 
 
 The foreign nationals were considerably happier.  One offered that the BND (German 
national intelligence) had a similar problem in the 1970’s such that they established a special 
“drunkards” unit to deal with about 35 of the operators they could not fire.  A recurring problem in 
this domain is the problem of “graymail” or threats from former operators that if they do not get their 
perpetual pension, and promptly, they will spill their beans and reveal secrets.  So many have such 
embarrassing secrets to share that they almost always get their way, and are paid off.  The BND paid 
theirs to clip newspapers until noon anyway, and be quite for the rest of their natural lives.  
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 Another offered much better references on the parallel problems in MOSSAD, to avoid citing 
Ostrovsky who is widely hated there (for fairly good reasons).  Some Nordic defense folks could not 
wait to see the sequel, because they are forever trying to survive clashes between the hegemon and in 
past, the Russian bear, at present, the coalition of forces lining up against the hegemon.  Our defense 
guys are rather worried about that expectable trend, especially since it cannot be discussed openly 
today without risking one’s career due to the extreme dominance of certain political appointees in 
the Pentagon, and their crystal clear propensity for firing folks who cross the taboo lines.  One CIA 
vet with a pure heart whispered that it is true there too; today, one must whisper and obey.   
 
 That is one huge problem for the US of A, in my unvarnished opinion.  Over and out – MA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Postscript for the Peace Studies section of the International Studies Association, late Feb. 2005. 
 
 So what does all that mean, in practical terms, for the Peace Community?  First, it could 
increase the weight of those who regard our task as fundamentally a mental health problem.  Second, 
to me it reduces the fear which normally comes from being on government “lists.”  Believe me, you 
are on lists, but you are in great company and literally tens of millions of us are on such lists today.  
In fact, modern information processing methods and technology, and the whole “Total Information 
Awareness” thing which many rightly fear, actually tends to paralyze the spooks who spend their 
lives at computers trying to monitor everything and everyone.  They can push a button and get a 
detailed dossier on any of us in seconds now, but they are also so buried by the “fire hose” (another 
trade term) of information they get that they can barely move.  Very large percentages don’t have 
enough time left to keep their marriages together or their sanity either, much less to go out and 
harass the tens of millions of democratic citizens who say something naughty about our dear leaders. 
 
 A significant percentage of those who monitor mail actually become mildly paranoid as well, 
which almost unbelievably makes them afraid to go out and pester the peace activists.  Of course, 
there are undercover agents who do this every day – a subspecialty among the 57 varieties of spies.  
But you know, I’ve encountered several personally and they run, not walk, away from exposure. 
 
 In theory, our spies can read almost anyone’s mail these days and in practice they intercept 
almost all international electronic communications to run through Cray computers looking for 
naughty bits.  In practice, this means they are utterly overwhelmed by the constant babble.  And of 
course the stuff they really want to listen in on is the stuff that is getting encrypted or going over 
fiber-optic cables (much harder to penetrate and intercept).  The battle between military units, real 
“terrorists” and professional spies to secure their communications is so far beyond what peace 
activists can do, or care to do, that we might as well exist in different universes.   
  
 So the bottom line for peace activists is:  Do not let the paranoia of the spooks overwhelm 
your good sense too.  Communicate for the common good; just don’t assume it’s private.  Rules of 
email apply, but press on, and do good for the earth and all on it.  Believe me, you’ll be healthier. 
 
 Back to the mental health aspect for one final focus.  I wrote bluntly in previous pages about 
mental issues among spies; they cannot be underestimated.  But few peace activists approach the 
professional military much less the spy community as though they were wounded victims of toxic 
systems, deserving of our compassion.  That is a critical mistake.  Aggressive confrontation simply 
energizes their already strong defense mechanisms.  We should heal the spies, not defeat them.  We 
should make them friends instead of enemies.  This is actually classical peace technique, but it has 
been hard to apply among we who have been spied upon and lied to for so many years.   – end –  
